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PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING IN THE 
POST-BANDEMER ERA 
Charles Backstrom,*Leonard Robins,**and Scott Eller*** 
Last year, the Supreme Court decided a case dealing purely 
with the issue of partisan gerrymandering for the first time. 1 The 
Court unequivocally ruled gerrymandering to be justiciable, but 
failed to assemble a majority behind any standard. Consequently 
the task of developing a measure of partisan gerrymandering has 
become urgent. 
In an earlier article2 we argued that the main obstacle to effec-
tive court action against partisan gerrymandering was the lack of a 
clear, precise measure of partisan gerrymandering.J We developed 
a specific political measure and demonstrated it in a case study. 
Recognizing the difficulty of measuring gerrymandering, we urged 
other scholars to address the issue. In the ensuing years, there has 
been much written on the subject.4 Since the Court has opened the 
• Professor of Political Science, University of Minnesota. 
•• Professor of Public Administration, Roosevelt University. 
... Attorney, Best & Flanagan, Minneapolis, Minnesota. 
The authors acknowledge the assistance of Samuel Krislov and Frank Sorauf, Professors of 
Political Science, Carl Auerbach, Professor of Law, and Philip Frickey, Associate Professor 
of Law, all of the University of Minnesota, who of course bear no responsibility for the final 
product. Earlier versions of this work were presented as papers at meetings of the Southeast 
Public Administration Conference, Charleston, South Carolina, October 24, 1985 and the 
American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., August 28, 1986. 
I. Davis v. Bandemer,- U.S.-, 106 S. Ct. 2797 (1986). We will hereinafter refer to 
this case, at both district and Supreme Court levels, as Bandemer. 
2. Backstrom, Robins & Eller, "Issues in Gerrymandering: An Exploratory Measure of 
Partisan Gerrymandering Applied to Minnesota," 62 MINN. L. REv. 1121 (1978). 
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Perspective, 33 UCLA L. REv. 77 (1985); Grofman, Measures of Bias and Proportionality in 
Seats-Votes Relationships, 9 PoLITICAL METHODOLOGY 295 (1983); Grofman & Scarrow, 
Current Issues in Reapportionment, 4 LAW & POLICY Q. 435 (1982); Lowenstein & Steinberg, 
The Quest for Legislative Districting in the Public Interest: Elusive or Illusory? 33 UCLA L. 
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door to considering partisan gerrymandering, we tum again to the 
challenge of crafting an effective test for gerrymandering. Our fun-
damental approach-the need for a political measure for a political 
problem-remains largely unchanged, but we have modified some 
of our arguments to address the concerns raised by several Justices. 
This article begins with a review of the important cases since 
1978 involving legislative districting. Next it reviews the arguments 
that culminated in the current decision that partisan gerrymander-
ing is justiciable. It then assesses various measures that have been 
proposed to determine the presence of unconstitutional partisan 
gerrymandering, including those suggested by various members of 
the Supreme Court. In addition to a political measure, these in-
clude structural factors (such as compactness), and procedural mat-
ters (such as intent). We then present our reformulated standard 
for judging partisan gerrymandering, and conclude by laying out a 
set of decision rules that courts should use in determining whether 
unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering is present in a given legis-
lative districting plan. 
I. DEVELOPING STANDARDS IN RECENT 
REAPPORTIONMENT DECISIONS 
A. POPULATION DISPARITIES 
Redistricting challenges in the 1980s focused primarily on pop-
ulation equality among the districts. The courts also continued to 
distinguish between congressional districting and state legislative 
districting. s 
In congressional districting, one court rejected an Arkansas re-
districting plan with population disparities of less than 2 percent,6 
but another federal court sustained a Pennsylvania plan with devia-
tions of 0.4 percent.' The court's willingness to accept this small 
deviation seemed to augur well for the establishment of a de 
minimis population variation of up to 1 percent. But this specula-
tion proved inaccurate when in Karcher v. Daggett s Justice Bren-
Invidious or Benevolent? Gaffney v. Cummings and Its Aftermath, 44 JOURNAL OF POLITICS 
810 (1982); Shapiro, Gerrymandering, Unfairness, and The Supreme Court, 33 UCLA L. 
REV. 227 (1985); B. Grofman, Criteria for Single-Member Districting (mimeograph ed. 
1983). 
5. See, e.g., Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 320-22 (1973) (distinguishing between 
article I, section 2 of the U.S. Constitution as the source of requirements for Congressional 
districting, and the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment as the source for 
requirements for districting of state legislatures). 
6. See Doulin v. White, 528 F. Supp. 1323 (E.D. Ark. 1982). 
7. See In re Pennsylvania Congressional Districts Reapportionment Cases, 535 F. 
Supp. 191 (M.D. Penn. 1982). 
8. 462 u.s. 725 (1983). 
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nan, writing for a five-person majority, invalidated a New Jersey 
congressional districting plan with maximum population deviations 
of 0.6984 percent. Statistical experts testified that, given the inaccu-
racy of census data, there may be no difference in the actual popula-
tions of these districts. But ignoring this well-documented 
evidence, the Court took the numbers at face value. The Court held 
that "there are no de minimis population variations, which could 
practicably be avoided, but which nonetheless meet the standard of 
Art. I, Sec. 2, without justification. "9 
A different pattern appeared in lower-court rulings on state 
legislative districting. Guided by the 16.4 percent "tolerable limits" 
population variance permitted in Mahan v. Howell, lower courts 
sanctioned population deviations of nearly 14 percent in New 
Hampshirew and 11 percent in Montana. II A successful challenge 
was made to a Virginia redistricting plan containing a deviation of 
26.63 percent.I2 Hawaii senate deviations of 43.13 percent were 
found "facially unconstitutional," while 9 percent house deviations 
on the island of Oahu were declared unconstitutional because they 
appeared to lack any justification.B 
Again, the Supreme Court rejected the emerging consensus in 
the lower courts. In Brown v. Thomson,J4 Justice Powell, writing 
for a five-to-four majority, appeared to reduce the permissible de 
minimis deviation, holding that anything over 10 percent would 
constitute "prima facie constitutional violations" requiring justifica-
tion. Yet Brown went on to approve a Wyoming state legislative 
plan that permitted an 89 percent population deviation between dis-
tricts, on the ground that it was necessary to continue Wyoming's 
county representative system. 
The apparent-and dismaying-ease with which huge popula-
tion disparities were justified in Brown predictably encouraged state 
legislatures to strain the one person/one vote principle. The Second 
Circuit has cited Brown as underscoring the latitude afforded state 
and local governments in the districting process.1s The Idaho 
Supreme Court, citing Brown, indicated in dicta that a 41.3 percent 
deviation "would still pass muster under federal constitutional 
standards."I6 
9. /d. at 734. This holding was consistent with the Court's early refusal to allow any 
unjustified deviation from absolute equality. See Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526 (1969). 
10. See Boyer v. Gardner, 540 F. Supp. 624 (D.N.H. 1982). 
II. See McBride v. Mahoney, 573 F. Supp. 913 (D. Mont. 1983). 
12. See Cosner v. Dalton, 522 F. Supp. 350 (E.D. Va. 1981). 
13. See Travis v. King, 552 F. Supp. 554 (D. Haw. 1982). 
14. 462 u.s. 835, 842-43 (1983). 
15. League of Women Voters v. Nassau County Board, 737 F.2d !55 (2d Cir. 1984). 
16. Hellar v. Cenarrusa, 682 P.2d 524 (1984). Not all judges are persuaded that equal 
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Although the connection is often overlooked, population 
equality is closely linked to the gerrymandering issue. Population 
equality, while remaining in its own right the key criterion for judg-
ing redistricting plans, is also essential because any deviation from it 
is almost certainly a strong indication of a possible partisan 
gerrymander. 
Historically, the original attack on gerrymandering was made 
using measures of population inequity. Courts developed a variety 
of measures, but eventually sifted out and accepted one that was 
relatively simple to compute and understand. The percentage range 
between the extreme population districts, using the U.S. Census's 
decennial full-population count, is the sole measure in use today.11 
Because "one person/one vote" has such great symbolic appeal 
to the equalitarian values in a democracy, it really has been forgot-
ten that until Baker v. Carr population disparities among districts 
were allowed to continue or were created deliberately to benefit 
some group. Rural people as a class kept control of many legisla-
tures through the "silent gerrymander" Is of not readjusting district 
lines to follow urban growth. 
Population gerrymanders protected not only regional and eco-
nomic interests, but also conferred partisan advantage. Unequal 
districts were perpetuated not only for their own sake, but because 
they conferred an unfair advantage in the legislative struggle. In 
the North and East the Republicans preserved what AI Smith called 
a "constitutional majority," while the Democrats in the Southwest 
did the same for themselves to a lesser degree. 19 
Requiring population equality thus constrains unfair group ad-
vantage and assists in the control of partisan gerrymandering. At 
the same time, however, exclusive attention to population consti-
tutes a trap into which courts can fall by thinking that achievement 
of population equality cures all inequity. It may have led to the 
Supreme Court's intolerance of ever-smaller population differences, 
population standards should be so weakened, as illustrated by Justice Shepard, dissenting, 
who called Brown a 3-2-4 decision that "simply cannot be reconciled with previous opinions 
of the Court" or with the Karcher opinion enunciated the same day. /d. at 534-35. 
17. The measure of population equality now used has two forms: a) how much the 
population of the largest or smallest district differs from the "ideal" district (figured by divid-
ing the state's population by the number of seats in the legislative chamber understudy), 
shown as a ratio (e.g., 1.15 to 1.00) or a percentage (15 percent), or b) the ratio or percentage 
by which the largest district exceeds the smallest (if the largest is 4 percent above ideal and 
the smallest 3 percent below, the range is 7 percent). 
18. See G. BAKER, RURAL VERSUS URBAN POLITICAL POWER 13 (1955). 
]9. M. JEWELL & S. PATTERSON, THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS IN THE UNITED 
STATES 51 (1966). 
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as in Karcher.2o This action also compels lower courts to be ob-
sessed with ever tinier numbers: on remand of Karcher, for exam-
ple, the district court chose the one plan of three with the smallest 
variation-twenty-five persons;21 and in Minnesota, the three-judge 
court protected themselves against further challenge by designing 
congressional districts as close as one person from the ideal size.22 
The current state of affairs cries out for a de minimis standard 
that is real but low. We recommend 1 percent in Congressional 
districts (5000 people), and 5 percent in legislative districts (1500 
people for house districts in a state with Minnesota's median state 
district size-total state population divided by size of the legislative 
body). This will put the burden of proof on the challenging party, 
where it belongs. The 5-percent allowance keeps a strong emphasis 
on population equality but will avoid challenges to normal legisla-
tive action on districting. More important, it establishes the princi-
ple that the larger the deviation the greater the justification that is 
required. The allowance also precludes thoughtless substitution of 
a clever partisan gerrymander just because it is arithmetically "bet-
ter" than the official plan on population. 
B. PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING 
Although the Supreme Court had never overturned a district-
ing plan on the basis of partisan gerrymandering, several opinions 
prior to Bandemer had recognized the political nature of redistrict-
ing.23 In Karcher, one approach to partisan gerrymandering was 
explored by Justice Stevens's lengthy concurrence.24 Drawing on 
20. Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 738 (1983). 
21. Daggett v. Kimmelman, 580 F. Supp. 1259 (D.N.J. 1984). 
22. LaComb v. Growe, 541 F. Supp. 145, 149 (D. Minn. 1982). This fixation on popu-
lation equality can lead to overlooking the phenomenon of the equi-populous gerrymander. 
R. Engstrom, The Supreme Court and Equi-Populous Gerrymandering 38 (paper presented 
at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association [hereinafter APSA], San 
Francisco, CA (1975)). Since the Bandemer plurality failed to indict the gerrymander in 
Indiana, Justice Powell accuses them of asserting that achieving one-person/one vote pre-
cluded the existence of a gerrymander, a trap that some of the early districting reformers fell 
into, but to us this charge seems unfair. 
Although we do not agree with those who argue that equal population requirements 
make partisan gerrymandering easier (seeR. DIXON, DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION: RE-
APPORTIONMENT LAW AND POLITICS 18 (1968))-every constraint in district drawing 
makes it harder-we have earlier demonstrated that tremendous opportunities exist for 
achieving partisan advantage within tight population standards without unduly straining 
one's cartographic skilJs. Confining judicial action to population tests engenders a false sense 
of security about gerrymandering having been foreclosed. 
23. See, e.g., Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973); Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 
542 (1969). In contrast, a New York state court rejected justiciability of political gerryman-
dering, calling it "a hopeless morass." Bay Ridge Community Council v. Carey, 115 Misc. 2d 
433, 454 N.Y.S.2d 186 (1983), a./fd, 479 N.Y.S.2d 746 (A.D. 2d Dept. 1984). 
24. Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 744 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
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his separate opinions in City of Mobile v. Bolden zs and Rogers v. 
Lodge,z6 Justice Stevens proposed detailed standards for assessing a 
potential partisan gerrymander. Stating that "political gerryman-
dering is one species of 'vote dilution' that is proscribed by the 
Equal Protection Clause," Justice Stevens clearly delineated the 
shortcomings of pure population analyses.21 Moreover, he rejected 
a narrow focus on legislative intent, noting that "it is unrealistic to 
attempt to proscribe all political considerations in the essentially 
political process of redistricting."zs Justice Stevens asserted that 
prima facie evidence of political gerrymandering could be found in 
"drastic departures from compactness,"z9 "extensive deviation from 
established political boundaries,"3o or in a procedural history that 
"excluded divergent viewpoints, openly reflected the use of partisan 
criteria, and provided no explanation of the reasons for selecting 
one plan over another."3t The state could overcome this presump-
tion by demonstrating that "the plan as a whole embodies accepta-
ble, neutral objectives."32 Applying his standards to the New Jersey 
plan, Justice Stevens found unjustifiable violations of compactness, 
a decision-making process that was "far from neutral," and con-
cluded that the state had advanced no legitimate justifications for 
the irregularities of the plan.33 
Partisan gerrymandering was squarely addressed by a federal 
district court in 1984. In Bandemer v. Davis34 the majority of a 
three-judge district court found that the 1981 Indiana apportion-
ment act violated the equal protection clause by diluting the voting 
strength of Democrats. Drawing heavily upon Justice Stevens's 
concurrence in Karcher, the Bandemer majority found that many 
"bright lines"3s pointed toward an anti-Democratic gerrymander. 
The majority found indications of partisan gerrymandering in the 
contorted shapes of many of the districts, the inconsistent use of 
multi-member districts, and the "unashamedly partisan" motiva-
25. 446 U.S. 55, 83 (1980), (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). 
26. 458 U.S. 613, 631 (1982), (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
27. Karcher, 462 U.S. at 750-53 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing Backstrom, Robins, & 
Eller, supra note 2, at 1131-39). 
28. /d. at 753. 
29. /d. at 758. 
30. /d. 
31. /d. at 759. 
32. /d. at 760. 
33. /d. at 764-65. In addition, Justice Powell, while dissenting from the majority in 
Karcher, agreed with many of Justice Steven's conclusions and explicitly stated that he was 
prepared to entertain constitutional challenges to partisan gerrymandering. 
34. 603 F. Supp. 1479 (S.D. Ind. 1984). 
35. Brief for Appellee at 43, Davis v. Bandemer,- U.S.-, 106 S. Ct. 2797 (1986) (No. 
84-1244). 
1987] GERRYMANDERING 291 
tion for the districting plan.36 Population variation was not an is-
sue, because the approximately 1 percent deviation was well within 
prior standards for state legislative districting.37 The court con-
cluded that Democrats were an "identifiable political group whose 
voting strength has been diluted" within the meaning of Justice Ste-
vens's Karcher concurrenceJs and that the prima facie showing of 
gerrymandering was not rebutted by the official district drawers.39 
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, sustaining the consti-
tutionality of the Indiana redistricting plan.40 A 6-3 majority held 
that partisan gerrymandering claims are justiciable. But writing for 
a different 7-2 majority, Justice White found that the evidence pro-
duced in the Indiana case was insufficient to meet the "high stan-
dard" required to overturn a districting plan. In dissent, Justice 
Powell, joined by Justice Stevens, essentially restated the arguments 
presented by Justice Stevens in Karcher and agreed with the district 
court's finding of unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering.4I Jus-
tice O'Connor, joined by Justice Rehnquist and Chief Justice Bur-
ger, agreed that the lower court should be reversed, but dissented 
from the holding that partisan gerrymandering is justiciable.42 We 
will analyze the Bandemer opinions in detail in the next two 
sections. 
II. BANDEMER AND THE JUSTICIABILITY OF 
GERRYMANDERING 
First reports on the Bandemer decision in the media empha-
sized that the Court had approved the confessed gerrymander in 
Indiana. The noteworthy aspect of the opinion was, however, that 
the Court ruled clearly for the first time that claims of partisan ger-
rymandering are justiciable. This ruling establishes an important 
constitutional right-that of members of a political party to have · 
their votes count equally-and it assures them that courts will con-
sider challenges to districting plans that reveal partisan 
gerrymandering. 
The Court actually held that partisan gerrymandering is not a 
"political question." The majority settled on a narrow definition of 
this term, confining it mainly to matters relating to separation of 
powers. Examples would be cases involving foreign policy matters 
36. Bandemer, 603 F. Supp. at 1486-89. 
37. /d. at 1485. 
38. /d. at 1493 (citing Karcher, 462 U.S. at 744 (Stevens, J., concurring)). 
39. /d. at 1495. 
40. Davis v. Bandemer,- U.S.-, 106 S. Ct. 2797 (1986). 
41. Id. at 2825. (Powell, J., concurring in Part II, and dissenting). 
42. /d. at 2816. (O'Connor, J. concurring in the judgment). 
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where judicial intervention could cause grave international 
problems. The Court used this argument in Baker v. Carr43 to 
make way for court action to remedy discrimination arising from 
unequal numbers of people assigned to the various legislative 
districts. 
Although Baker v. Carr was decided on that narrow ground, 
Justice Brennan's opinion adumbrated several other criteria for 
political questions. These included the lack of discernible and man-
ageable judicial standards, the necessity for the court to make a 
prior public policy choice before reaching the question at issue in 
the case at bar, or the need to avoid the confusion that would result 
if the court did not adhere to a political decision already made.44 In 
Bandemer, Justice O'Connor argued that there is no way to mea-
sure partisan gerrymandering; absolute equality among partisans in 
a legislature could be achieved only with proportional representa-
tion, a "prior policy choice" by the Court that would undo the dis-
trict system that has established itself as a foundation of American 
representation and a key to preservation of the two-party system. 
Trying to decide claims of fairness between parties in election mat-
ters is a political thicket that courts should avoid.4s In response, 
Justice White pointed out that standards do not have to be available 
at the very moment that a constitutional evil is identified. The ques-
tion in Baker v. Carr, after all, was not whether unequal population 
representation was unfair, but whether the courts should step in and 
decide whether it was unfair-in other words, whether the issue was 
justiciable. Baker v. Carr turned on this issue alone; the case's sig-
nificance lay in the Supreme Court's readiness to deal with the issue 
of comparative legislative district population. The application of 
actual measures of inequality and the setting of standard of equal-
ity, however, were left to Reynolds v. Sims46 and its progeny.47 
Those who oppose granting justiciability for partisan gerry-
mandering can do so without reaching the question of adequacy of 
measures. They can object because they believe that (a) partisan 
politics does not matter in state legislative races or actions and 
therefore the allegation of a political gerrymander is irrelevant to 
public affairs; (b) districting is inherently and irremediably, or even 
43. 369 u.s. 186 (1962). 
44. /d. at 217. 
45. 106 S. Ct. at 2816. 
46. 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (holding that malapportionment of the Alabama state legisla-
ture violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment). 
47. See, e.g. Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725 (1983); Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315 
(1973); Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526 (1969); Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 542 
(1969). 
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beneficially, a matter of political judgment; or (c) courts would be 
hurting themselves politically if they tried to alleviate gerrymander-
ing. We will deal with these allegations in turn. 
A. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF PARTIES 
Although Justice O'Connor values the two-party system, she 
denies that a political party is an entity that could be harmed. She 
assumes that people at the polls vote for individual candidates and 
not for the statewide party,4s and categorizes Baker v. Carr as turn-
ing on an individual's right to vote, not a group right.49 She asserts 
that an individual voting in a statewide election cannot be harmed 
by an outcome that results from happenings outside his or her own 
district. She ridicules that concept by using the congressional anal-
ogy which asserts that voters in one state were harmed by election 
results in another state.so Also, if party "members" are to be 
counted, Justice O'Connor sees no fair way to count independ-
ents.si Justice O'Connor concludes that a political party is not an 
identifiable group that can be given constitutional protection. Fi-
nally, she is troubled that, in contrast to race, adherence to a polit-
ical party is not immutable.s2 
Parties play crucial roles in state elections. Political scientists 
have noted the decline in partisan identification among voters, and 
the willingness of voters to support incumbent Congressmen irre-
spective of party, based on personal service.sJ Nevertheless party 
identification remains the most salient cue for voters in races where 
they have little other information.s4 All party candidates prefer to 
run in a district where more of their fellow partisans are concen-
trated because it gives them a basis for trust and confidence from 
which to build. Indeed, a prominent scholar of state politics finds 
that parties are growing stronger, not weaker, at the state levei.ss 
Once legislators are in office, moreover, they form caucuses to 
advance their personal and program goals. The majority caucus 
will usually control all leadership positions and install all committee 
chairs, thus dominating the rules and agenda. Caucuses may meet 
to discuss bills, and while it would be rare to "lay on the whips" to 
48. 106 S. Ct. at 2821. 
49. /d. at 2819. 
50. /d. at 2821. 
51. /d. at 2822. 
52. /d. at 2823. 
53. W. CROITY, AMERICAN PARTIES IN THEIR DISTRICT DECLINE 210-16 (1984); R. 
FENNO, HOME STYLE: HOUSE MEMBERS IN THEIR DISTRICTS 113 (1978); Mayhew, Con-
gressional Elections: The Case of the Vanishing Marginals, 6 POLITY 295 (1974); . 
54. W. CROITY, supra note 53, at 210. 
55. S. MOREHOUSE, STATE POLITICS, PARTIES, AND POLICY 29-30 (1981). 
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back a party position, the subtle pressure to go along with party 
leaders increases the significance of party in policy outcomes. It is 
true that voting in state legislatures does not always follow party 
lines, but there is likely to be some ideological distinction between 
the center of gravity of the two major parties. Votes on crucial mat-
ters like spending, taxation, business regulation, and labor law will 
more typically divide by party.s6 
Usually legislative coalitions are closely related to the party 
designations under which the candidates ran in the election. Legis-
lative leaders are likely to be prominent in state party activities, es-
pecially in the formation of platform positions. State party 
organizations, or the legislative caucuses themselves, often raise 
funds collectively to assist their members to win reelection, and 
some opposition members will be targeted for defeat in hopes of 
gaining or retaining a working majority. 
With all of this partisan activity in the election of and opera-
tion of legislatures, it is important to insure a fair base from which 
to start the partisan contest. There now may be more independents 
among voters, but at the polls they almost always must choose be-
tween the Republican and the Democratic candidates. And 
whatever their motivation for supporting a particular candidate on 
election day, voters-independents along with partisans of various 
strengths-will probably end up with a partisan member, or one 
who at least must operate in the highly partisan milieu of legislative 
caucus politics. 
Legislators and state political activists go through such agony 
and pryotechnics on this issue because they believe it to be vital to 
election outcomes and legislative action. Absent overwhelming evi-
dence to the contrary, it would seem foolish for courts to disagree 
with this assessment. 
B. THE POLmCS OF REDISTRICTING 
Justice O'Connor does not see partisan gerrymandering as an 
evil that needs to be dealt with by the courts. First she argues that 
gerrymandering is one of the legitimate spoils of the majority 
party.s1 Then she says that parties can fend for themselves without 
judicial aid.ss Political gerrymandering is self-limiting, she argues, 
because the majority party could dangerously weaken its hold on 
56. SeeM. JEWELL & D. OLSON, AMERICAN STATE PoLmCAL PARTIES AND ELEC· 
TIONS 290 (rev. ed. 1982); LeBlanc, Voting in State Senates: Pany and Constituency Influ-
ences, 13 Mmw. J. PoL. SCI. 33, 56 (1969). 
57. Davis v. Bandemer,- U.S.-, 106 S. Ct. 2797, 2820 (1986). 
58. /d. 
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some seats if it overreaches by putting too many of its partisans into 
an adjacent district in an attempt to control it too.s9 Finally, 
according to Justice O'Connor, most gerrymanders are bipartisan 
anyway, so neither party is really hurt.60 Perhaps incumbent legisla-
tors are actually more interested in protection of their own seats 
than in the advancement of their party's overall interest.6I In short, 
"politicians will be politicians." 
This idea is, we believe, dangerous to the political ethos of a 
democracy. Popular support for laws depends upon the losers in 
this legislative election believing that they have a fair chance to be 
the victors in the next. A gerrymander sets up a basic handicap to 
fair competition between the major contenders for political power. 
If gerrymandering has unfairly increased the likelihood of an erst-
while majority's ten-year control of the legislature, this consensus 
would be lost, and the resultant unbounded cynicism would corrode 
the political compact. The assertion that parties can fend for them-
selves is merely the updated version of Justice Frankfurter's view 
that the remedy for population inequalities was for the voters to 
"sear the consciences of their lawmakers."62 What actually hap-
pened was that as population inequalities widened, the advantaged 
groups hung onto them more tightly. 
C. POLITICAL DAMAGE TO COURTS 
Justice O'Connor's main reason for rejecting judicial involve-
ment in partisan gerrymandering was clearly her belief that it is a 
risky area for judicial action, a political thicket that courts would be 
well-advised to avoid.63 Political damage to the courts is likely to 
be found when courts confront three kinds of issues: (1) a problem 
that the courts are not good at solving--or may be even worse at 
solving than some other branch, in this instance the legislature; 
(2) a problem on which court action could have no effect, or (3) a 
problem that can cost the courts political support and credibility.64 
Under these three criteria, partisan gerrymandering is not a 
thicket. First, the courts are actually more suitable for handling 
reapportionment than legislatures for three reasons. Courts are 
59. ld., (citing B. CAIN, THE REAPPORTIONMENT PUZZLE, 151-59 (1984)). 
60. ld. at 2821. 
61. ld. at 2822. 
62. Baker, 369 U.S. at 270 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
63. Bandemer, 106 S. Ct. at 2816. 
64. See C.H. PRITCHETI, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM 82-83 (3d ed. 
1971) (distinguishing between political question and political thicket, but associating them as 
ways in which the Court avoids issues). In contrast, Justice Frankfurter did not distinguish 
between the terms. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 266 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
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freer to develop and follow standards than the legislature, where 
compromise is a way of life. Judges are free from conflicts of inter-
est involving the security of their own jobs. If legislative reappor-
tionment is left to legislators without judicial supervision, however, 
that task must be done by people with a monumental conflict of 
interest. Second, as to the efficacy of court action on gerrymander-
ing, the courts have shown that they can affect reapportionment: 
they can void elections, make legislators redraw a plan, or draw a 
better plan themselves. 65 Third, the courts will not suffer politically 
from correcting gerrymandering because, as in population redis-
tricting where opposition blew over quickly, there will be gainers as 
well as losers. Avid partisans undoubtedly would be elated to re-
ceive a special advantage in elections, but they cannot claim gerry-
mandering is fair, and therefore cannot openly urge it. Unlike the 
little federalism argument for defending population inequalities, 
which almost negated Baker v. Carr through the Dirksen Amend-
ment,66 no rational argument could be made to favor unfair partisan 
advantage. 
The courts do, however, need assistance in developing clear 
criteria for detecting and measuring partisan gerrymandering. This 
is essential for ultimate acceptance of a judicial remedy. Without 
them there is a serious danger that the Court will ultimately adopt a 
post-election proportional representation standard which Justice 
O'Connor correctly fears and warns against. There is also merit in 
Justice Powell's concern that, as formulated by Justice White for 
the plurality in Bandemer, almost any conceivable plan that meets 
acceptable population-equality standards would be acceptable from 
a partisan standpoint. It is to these questions of measures and stan-
dards we now tum. 
III. DETECTION AND MEASURES OF 
GERRYMANDERING 
Although six Justices agreed that partisan gerrymandering was 
justiciable, they could not agree amongst themselves on an appro-
priate measure of gerrymandering. Instead, the plurality of four 
joined the three Justices who contend that gerrymandering is non-
justiciable to form a 7-2 majority to uphold Indiana's redistricting, 
65. There are some limits to judicial discretion. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed a 
district court's 50-percent reduction of the size of the Minnesota legislature as unnecessary to 
achieve the goal of equal-population districts. See Beens v. Erdahl, 336 F. Supp. 715 (D. 
Minn. 1972), vacated and remanded per curiam sub nom. Sixty-seventh Minnesota State 
Senate v. Beens, 406 U.S. 187 (1972). 
66. See CoNGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY-SERVICE, CONGRESS AND THE NATION, 1965-
1968, at 423-34 (1972). 
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which Justice Powell labeled a "paradigm example of unconstitu-
tional discrimination."67 Under these circumstances, we cannot 
share Justice White's facile optimism that district judges will have 
no difficulty in crafting acceptable measures of gerrymandering.6s 
In this section we will elucidate and critique the Court's dis-
cussion of a satisfactory measure of gerrymandering and analyze 
other proposed measures. Following that, we present what we 
think is an appropriate measure. 
First, however, a look at what is to be measured. Nowhere 
does the plurality formally define partisan gerrymandering. At the 
outset Justice White identifies the issue as vote dilution.69 Next he 
states that each political group in a state should have the same 
chance to elect representatives of its choice as any other political 
group. 10 This sounds as though no discrimination whatsoever 
would be tolerated. Later, however, he agrees that some amount of 
gerrymandering is acceptable. There is also an acceptable level of 
gerrymanders for Justice Powell. He distinguishes between the 
common-and to him acceptable-practice of a majority party 
seeking to advantage itself through choosing a favorable redistrict-
ing plan from the use of a high degree of deliberate and arbitrary 
action as shown by intent and method of district design.11 
We think confusion would be reduced if the term "gerryman-
der" were reserved for unconstitutional districting plans. n This def-
inition is in contrast to the Justices who call any advantage for one 
party gerrymandering, but propose to outlaw it only when the ad-
vantage-seeking reaches a very substantial degree. To us this seems 
like saying that there is a degree of larceny that will not be consid-
ered a crime. 
We strongly agree with the Bandemer plurality of the Court 
that it is not esthetic characteristics like the shape of the districts 
that constitute the essence of a partisan gerrymander, but the unfair 
political advantage that such district drawing gives to one party 
over another. Although other elements of legislative districting, 
such as those included in Justice Powell's dissent, may not be suffi-
cient proof of the presence of a gerrymander, we would not totally 
dismiss Justice Powell's "neutral factors" as the plurality did. 73 
67. Davis v. Bandemer,- U.S.-, 106 S. Ct. 2797, 2838 (1986) (Powell, J., dissenting). 
68. ld. at 2806-07. 
69. ld. at 2799. 
70. ld. at 2806. 
71. ld. 
72. Backstrom, Robins, & Eller, supra note 2, at 1129. We will continue to use this 
definition hereinafter. 
73. Bandemer, 106 S. Ct. at 2815. 
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The plurality justices74 focus on two factors: discriminatory 
intent and discriminatory etfect.7s We will discuss these in tum. 
A. DISCRIMINATORY INTENT AND STRUCTURAL DEFECTS 
Since City of Mobile v. Bolden 76 an initial hurdle that those 
claiming to be discriminated aginst must clear is the intent to dis-
criminate. The plaintiffs in Bandemer77 went to great lengths to 
prove intent. They relied on statements of Republican leaders of 
the legislature and the exclusionary legislative procedures that in-
sured that Republicans monopolized decisionmaking. 78 
In Bandemer the plurality lowered the intent barrier essentially 
by presuming intent. 79 Having found discriminatory intent with 
such apparent ease, the plurality rejected as unnecessary Justice 
Powell's more traditional measures of gerrymandering-compact-
ness, etc.so 
Justices Powell and Stevens, however, believe that unfair pro-
cedures in districting indicate a partisan gerrymander. In Indiana, 
according to Bandemer, these involved exclusion of all Democratic 
legislators from the committees drawing the districts; utilization of 
the state Republican committee headquarters for the data work 
done by a consultant (rather than the legislative research depart-
ment on the grounds that it was prohibited by statute from doing 
partisan work); bringing the bill to the floor on the last day of the 
session without opportunity for the Democrats to examine it; and 
the open admission that the aim of the majority party was to secure 
for themselves every possible seat by whatever means or design.st 
Intent alone, however, should not render a districting plan 
unconstitutional. 
Structural measures have both intrinsic bearing on the quality 
of a redistricting plan and utility as constraints against partisan ger-
rymandering. In this regard we agree with Justice Powell, although 
74. Justices White, Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun. 
75. Bandemer, 106 S. Ct. at 2808. 
76. 446 u.s. 55 (1980). 
77. Bandemer v. Davis, 603 F. Supp. 1479 (S.D. Ind. 1984). 
78. Specifically, this included the widely quoted statement by the Republican Speaker 
of the House that they had intended to gain the biggest possible advantage for their party, 
and the retaining (on a $250,000 consulting contract) of a Republican-oriented consultant 
from Detroit, Market Opinion Research, Inc., whose computer programs are known to maxi-
mize partisan advantage. In addition, Democrats were excluded from the drafting commit-
tee, from which the bill surfaced only forty hours before it was passed. /d. at 1483-84. 
79. Davis v. Bandemer,- U.S.-, 106 S. Ct. 2797, 2808, 2809 n.ll (1986). 
80. Id at 2813-15. 
81. Davis v. Bandemer,- U.S. -, 106 S. Ct. 2797 (1986). 
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we do not elevate them to the status of major tests for a gerryman-
der as he does. 
Several technical or mechanical choices confront those who ac-
tually draw legislative districts: whether to use single-member dis-
tricts, how neatly to outline the districts, and how much 
consideration should be given to other governmental lines already 
on the map. We disagree with those who give primary emphasis to 
such structural indicators in their analysis of gerrymandering, but 
some of them should be incorporated into standards for quality dis-
tricting once partisan fairness has been achieved. 
(1) Multi-member districts. The Supreme Court has never 
outlawed the use of multi-member districts in plans drawn by a 
state legislature.s2 Multi-member districts will be invalidated, how-
ever, if "designedly or otherwise, they would operate to minimize or 
cancel out the voting strength of racial or political elements of the 
voting population. "s3 In addition, the Supreme Court has instruc-
ture district courts who draw legislative district lines that they 
"should prefer single-member districts over multi-member districts, 
absent persuasive justification to the contrary."s4 
The district court in Bandemer held that inconsistent use of 
multi-member districts was ample evidence of intent to gerryman-
der.ss The plurality Justices disagreed. Although suspicious of 
multi-membered districts,s6 they did not find them per se constitu-
tionally impermissible. Instead, they reasoned that the very fact 
that Indiana had not used multi-member districts in every metro-
politan area in the state showed that there could not be a statewide 
discriminatory etfect.s7 This ignores the realities of gerrymander-
ing: to design districts of one type where the controlling party can 
win them, and to avoid that type where it will be to that same 
82. Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433 (1965); Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73 (1966). 
83. Fortson, 379 U.S. at 439. There is widespread agreement that multi-member dis-
tricts discriminate against racial minorities. B. Grofman, The Effect of Ward Versus At-
Large Elections on Minority Representation: Part I, A Theoretical Analysis; Part II, A 
Review and Critique of Twenty-Three Recent Empirical Studies (unpub, 1982) (on file with 
authors). On the effect of multi-member districts on partisan minorities in state legislatures, 
the evidence is mixed. Considered by districts, the minority party is usually disadvantaged in 
the multi-member districts themselves, although that party might redress the balance else-
where in the state in single-member districts. Considered statewide, on the average across 
states, the disadvantage for the minority party is in the range of 2-3 percent. R. Niemi, I. Hill 
& B. Grofman, The Impact of Multi-member District Elections on Partisan Representation 
in State Legislatures 8 (paper delivered at the annual meeting of APSA, Washington, DC 
(1984)). 
84. Wise v. Lipscomb, 437 U.S. 535, 540 (1978). 
85. Bandemer v. Davis, 603 F. Supp. 1479 (S.D. Ind. 1984). 
86. Davis v. Bandemer,- U.S.-, 106 S. Ct. 2797, 2813 (1986). 
87. /d. 
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party's disadvantage. The plurality cites Whitcomb v. Chavis,ss 
where the Supreme Court had been unwilling to accept mathemati-
cal demonstrations of how multi-member districts can discrimi-
nate.s9 What that case showed, they recalled, was that the reason 
blacks did not win more seats is that they did not get enough 
votes.90 
In our view, the Court passed up a good opportunity to strike 
down a districting technique that is undoubtedly a discriminatory 
practice when used inconsistently. Courts should, in addition, be 
suspicious of changes from one type of district to another in a new 
districting act where there could be no historic justification for the 
practice. In these circumstances the burden should be on the dis-
trict creators to prove that they have not intended to get nor in fact 
have gained an unfair pratisan advantage by mixing district types. 
(2) Uncompactness. The classic Gerrymander-Governor 
Gerry's salamander-shaped district-is an area that twists and 
turns and reaches to include or exclude certain sub-units. It is not 
compact. The district court in Bandemer found numerous horrific 
examples in Indiana to help persuade them that a gerrymander had 
been perpetrated.9t They did not use any rigorous measurement of 
compactness, relying instead on an optical test-the districts simply 
looked bad.92 The Supreme Court plurality, however, did not feel 
that they needed this evidence to prove intent; they did not consider 
the matter of compactness, but looked elsewhere for proof of effect. 
It is, in truth, difficult to develop a powerful case to demon-
strate the intrinsic value in having compact districts: If the repre-
sentative lived at the center, he or she wouldn't have to travel any 
88. 403 u.s. 124 (1971). 
89. /d. 
90. Bandemer, 106 S. Ct. at 2813. 
91. Bandemer v. Davis, 603 F. Supp. 1479, 1487-88 (S.D. Ind. 1984). 
92. The simplest measure of overall district compactness (the one we used in 1973) is 
the ratio of the actual area of the district to the area of the smallest circle that can be drawn 
around the district. See Reock, Measuring Compactness as a Requirement of Legislative Ap-
portionment, 5 Mmw. J. PoL SCI. 70 (1961). (A circular district would have a ratio of 
l.~the ideal-and a sprawling district somewhat less.) Presumably, guidelines to require 
violations of compactness could be adopted that required the average ratio to be greater than 
some set figure: 0.4, according to one authority. See A. HACKER, CoNGRESSIONAL Dts-
TRICTING: THE ISSUE OF EQUAL REPRESENTATION 72 (rev. 1964) (published by The Brook-
ings Institution). Of course, since averages do not point out single egregiously noncompact 
districts, a measure of the range between the most compact and the least compact districts 
could be used, but if all districts were noncompact, very bad districts would not seem so 
extreme. One author cites seven published tests of compactness, including the circle test, 
points out the faults of each, and proposes his own: minimizing the number of neighboring 
basic population units assigned to different districts by counting the number of edges cut,-in 
fact, a measure of the extent to which "neighbors are assigned to different districts." See H.P. 
Young, Measuring the Compactness of Legislative Districts (School of Public Affairs, Uni-
versity of Maryland, August, 1984). 
1987] GERRYMANDERING 301 
more than absolutely necessary to campaign door-to-door or to 
meet with constituents. Compactness in districting is a virtue, how-
ever, precisely because the long emphasis on visual standards for 
districts has elevated compactness to a position of preeminent value 
for the public. But the public cares for symmetry beyond mere es-
thetics; crooked districts lead the public, often correctly, to suspect 
crookedness by someone manipulating the districting process in or-
der to gain unfair advantage. This shows the significance of com-
pactness; it is a constraint upon gerrymanderers, but of course it 
does not of itself guarantee fair districts. Those who rely on com-
pactness alone as a test for gerrymandering are not aware of how 
easy it is for district drawers to come up with a compact-looking 
plan that is still a fearsome partisan gerrymander. Compactness 
then, like hyper-equal population, can become a snare that encour-
ages judicial acceptance of partisan gerrymandering while ostensi-
bly prohibiting it.93 
(3) Cutting subdivision lines. The majority district court 
judges in Bandemer noted that if the only goal was to achieve popu-
lation equality, the Indiana districting plan they voided cut county 
and municipal lines unnecessarily. For example, they interpreted 
the corralling of isolated municipalities from outside Indianapolis as 
an artifice for maintaining Republican advantage in the multi-mem-
ber districts of Marion County.94 On appeal, Justice Powell's dis-
sent maintained that the excessive cutting was itself a measure of 
how much gerrymandering had been done.9s 
The majority weakly responded that at least township lines had 
been preserved,96 but that is not much of a saving grace. Townships 
are the smallest census Minor Civil Divisions (MCDs) by which 
population figures are published in sparsely populated areas, there-
fore they must be the building blocks for any districting. A town-
ship could not be split because no one would know the population 
breakdown between the parts. (In more densely populated areas the 
Census Bureau collects data by "enumeration districts" that can be 
parts of townships.) More relevant is the fact that states commonly 
use townships as voting precincts in rural areas, which fits the ger-
rymanderer's needs when he or she can easily determine the polit-
ical complexion of a district made up of townships, but cannot 
easily estimate the vote in split townships. But again, as for other 
93. One scholar asserts that compactness is not a neutral measure, but instead always 
harms Democrats, who tend to be more concentrated in living patterns than Republicans. 
Lowenstein, supra note 4, at 26. 
94. Bandemer v. Davis, 603 F. Supp. 1479, 1487 (S.D. Ind. 1984). 
95. Davis v. Bandemer,- U.S.-, 106 S. Ct. 2797, 2825 (1986). 
96. /d. at 2801. 
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structural measures, the plurality rejected an analysis of the utility 
of municipal lines in judging whether the districting plan was un-
constitutionally discriminatory. 
Some authors have claimed that there is merit in not dividing 
local units between legislative districts.97 A local government may 
prefer to deal with a single representative and a single senator, even 
though a sounder strategy might be to divide itself between two dis-
tricts and have twice as many representatives accountable to it. 
Another argument for preserving local government lines is 
simplicity and effectiveness for the voter. Every study shows that 
few voters can identify their representatives. This is not surprising, 
since voters are presented with long ballots of officials in multiple 
layers of government. This daunting task for the voters could be 
simplified somewhat if legislative district boundaries were easily 
recognizable and relatively permanent. Myopic concern with popu-
lation equality has required reaching into the next ward in a city for 
another precinct or into the next county for another township to get 
the exact quota. Then the next census requires a somewhat new 
mixture of local units in the various districts even if their population 
has changed just slightly. This inconveniences voters. 
Counties are a socio-psychological reality for rural people, just 
as physical infrastructure like freeways and railroad tracks repre-
sent boundaries for usable space by city people. If those drawing 
legislative districts ignore commonly accepted boundaries, voters 
are handicapped. Their political effectiveness is also reduced when 
political parties choose candidates, and the few delegates from a 
piece of another county in the same legislative district are consid-
ered outsiders and roundly ignored in decisionmaking. 
The Supreme Court always appears to be inviting states to use 
the preservation of local boundaries to justify greater leeway in pop-
ulation size for legislative districts. Some states have taken up the 
offer: Virginia was allowed a 16.4 percent range allegedly to pre-
serve local sub-unit lines9s while Wyoming was allowed 89 percent 
to give even a very small county its own representative.99 
We believe a population deviation de minimis would simplify 
elections for a number of voters and save a few local units from 
needless division. As before, however, we suspect that the plea 
from some quarters to save local units and the way they actually are 
split, usually masks an attempted partisan gerrymander. Justice 
97. Campbell, Alford & Henry, Television Markets and Congressional Elections, 9 LEG. 
STUD. Q. 665 (1984). 
98. Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 319 (1973). 
99. Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 848 (1983). 
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Brennan, dissenting in Mahan, pointed out that all of the justified 
population deviation ran against the more liberal Washington sub-
urbs in northern Virginia. wo 
Moreover, attempting to judge districting plans on how much 
they respect local government boundaries is not easy. How many 
splits are too many? Is a little split from a single unit as bad as a big 
split? Are all units equally sacrosanct-are counties more sensitive 
to state legislation or voter identification than municipalities? The 
only useful standard compares several plans to determine which one 
cuts fewer sub-unit lines. 
(4) Breaking communities of interest. The district court in 
Bandemer focused on rural areas being conjoined with parts of Indi-
anapolis to illustrate how the district drawers ignored community 
of interest while seeking to gain greater partisan advantage. to' 
Community of interest as a goal to be sought in districting re-
lates to the local sub-units point just made; any sub-unit of govern-
ment has substantial interests in common. But the goal of 
preserving communities of interest comes into play when larger 
units must be cut, or smaller ones combined to make an ideal-sized 
district. Within a large unit of government that is entitled to more 
than one legislative district, cutting the unit in a particular way can 
clump together people of similar interests, possibly making them a 
sufficient majority to elect one of their own to the legislature. If the 
line ran another way, however, they might be split below a critical 
mass. Similarly, if several smaller units must be combined to make 
legislative districts, representation would be fairer if those commu-
nities with interests in common were aggregated rather than some 
being put together with very dissimilar components. 102 
Except for race, community of interest is hard to identify. 
Some scholars have attempted to do it by media markets,toJ but few 
of these coincide with a single congressional district, let alone with 
the ordinarily much smaller state legislative districts. In any event, 
preservation of these non-racial communities of interest is really 
just a hortatory goal for political decisionmakers to try to define 
100. Mahan, 410 U.S. at 344 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
101. Bandemer v. Davis, 603 F. Supp. 1479, 1487 (S.D. Ind. 1984). 
102. These considerations have arisen most strongly when the community of interest is a 
single racial or ethnic group, for example Blacks and Hispanics. We should add that leaders 
of these two groups pursue different strategies. Blacks typically prefer to be concentrated 
heavily to insure election of a Black representative, whereas Hispanics sometimes seek to 
spread their population in order to have a significant presence in a greater number of districts. 
B. CAIN, supra note 59, at 46-49, 95, 170. 
103. Campbell, Alford & Henry, supra note 97. 
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and include in designing district plans rather than a constitutional 
principle for judging districts. 
In summary, while the structural factors involved in district 
drawing have some intrinsic value, we do not believe that they rise 
to the constitutional level of proof of discrimination, as they do for 
Justices Powell and Stevens. The creation of measurements and 
standards of acceptability for these factors, however, will serve as 
constraints on the district drawers' self-interested partisan gerry-
mandering, a reality that the plurality Justices ignored. As the 
Supreme Court plurality correctly realized in Bandemer, a political 
measure of partisan effect must be central to the identification of a 
gerrymander. 
B. DISCRIMINATORY EFFECTS 
The Bandemer plurality correctly recognized the primacy of an 
effects measure for partisan gerrymandering. They get right to the 
heart of the issue in demanding that someone be hurt before they 
will intervene. In partisan gerrymandering the injury is to a polit-
ical party, its adherents who chose it as the instrument for working 
their will, and its public policy goals.I04 
But the Supreme Court was unable to devise a workable, prac-
ticable measure for gerrymandering. The Court looked at the single 
political measure on which the Indiana district court relied, and re-
jected it as inadequate. los They did not subject the districting plan 
to any other types of tests, such as the one proposed in our earlier 
article.I06 In truth, most measures that have been suggested by var-
ious scholars are flawed by impracticality, timing problems or by 
other events. 
In the record that came before the Supreme Court, the district 
court judges had relied on the results of the 1982 legislative elec-
tions, which were run on the challenged plan passed by the legisla-
ture the previous year. The district court compared the percentage 
of aggregate vote received by all legislators of each party with the 
percentage of seats each party had won. This showed that while the 
104. Davis v. Bandemer,- U.S.-, 106 S. Ct. 2797, 2806 (1986). 
105. Although the Court reversed, it did not find the district court's method or conclu-
sions to be "clearly erroneous." Bandemer, 106 S. Ct. at 2816. Justice Powell attacks this 
result. !d. at 2838 (Powell J ., dissenting). 
106. It should be noted that Judge Pell, dissenting in Bandemer, attempted to use our 
measure but did so incorrectly. It was, however, used correctly in the Appellee's Brief to the 
Supreme Court. Additionally, an exhaustive analysis of the Indiana redistricting plan, which 
applies our methodology, conclusively demonstrates that it was a gerrymander in favor of the 
Republicans. J. Cranor, G. Crawley & R. Scheele, The Anatomy of a Gerrymander (unpub. 
1986). I 
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complaining Democrats had received 51.9 percent of the votes for 
state House candidates, they won only 43 percent of the seats. 107 
This type of measure is commonly referred to as a "seats/votes" 
ratio. 
The plurality found this ratio an insufficiently demanding stan-
dard for several reasons: (1) it was based on only a single election; 
(2) an election may not be predictive, (3) unconstitutional discrimi-
nation is more than making it harder to win, and can only occur 
when "the electoral system is arranged in a manner that will con-
sistently degrade a voter's or a group of voters' influence on the 
political process as a whole."ws We will discuss each of the Court's 
comments about the measurement of gerrymandering, then critique 
some other types of measures, and conclude by urging the use of 
our own. 
The first question raised by the plurality was whether the re-
sults of a single election are sufficient. Who knows, the plurality 
Justices asked, whethe Indiana Democrats were truly harmed? Per-
haps in 1984 they would do better or perhaps, the Justices opined, 
the Democrats would be in the majority after the 1990 census and 
could dictate their own districting plan. Policymaking, however, is 
going ahead each year in the legislature, and who is in charge di-
rectly affects what that policy will be. Why should justice be 
delayed? As to waiting until the next census, a decade is essentially 
forever in the career of the average legislator and his partisan sup-
porters. Even worse, gerrymandering is cumulative: the party that 
ensconces itself in a majority for a decade probably will also be the 
one that is entitled to draw the districts after the next census. This 
is a textbook example of justice that is being denied by being 
delayed. 
We argued in an earlier articlet09 that a measure of partisan 
gerrymandering must be made before the next election of legislators 
to be of any practical use. Most measures proposed by others wait 
107. The majority found that: 
Most significant among these many statistical figures is the fact that in 1982 
Democratic candidates for the Indiana House earned 51.9 percent of all votes cast 
across the state. However, only 43 Democrats were elected to seats. Bandemer, 
603 F. Supp. at 1485. 
In dissent, Judge Pell determined that the normal vote in Indiana was 46.8 percent, and 
then compared this to the actual 43 percent of seats won to support his conclusion that no 
gerrymander existed. /d. at 1502. Judge Pell misapplied our measure. He chose several 
statewide races to average as a partisan index (a very acceptable procedure), but then com-
pared the statewide index on his measure to the proportion of legislative seats won, rather 
than subtracting to reach 50 percent and recalculating the index for each district and then 
counting up the majority's districts. 
108. Bandemer, 106 S. Ct. at 2810. 
109. Backstrom, Robins, & Eller, supra note 2, at 1127-28. 
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until an election has been held under the new plan, note the per-
centage of legislators elected from one party, and then compare this 
with the percentage of aggregate of votes for all legislators of that 
party. This procedure proves faulty on several grounds. 
As they begin their task, district drawers must have on hand 
objective guidelines with which to test various plans that are under 
consideration, or they have no way, even with the best of intentions, 
to tell whether they have drawn a permissible plan. Moreover, 
while court intervention may never be eliminated altogether, we 
should not encourage litigation in every state after every redistrict-
ing by testing with the results of elections held under the new plan. 
Finally, any measure of gerrymandering that requires a post-elec-
tion analysis will necessarily be influenced by all of the idiosyncra-
sies of that election itself.tJO 
After appearing to require multiple post-hoc election tests for 
gerrymandering, Justice White, under attack by Justice Powell,tll 
responds that evidence from several elections is not needed to prove 
gerrymandering; evidence could also include estimates of partisan 
voting strength from some race prior to the enactment of the dis-
tricting plan.tt2 It is encouraging that Justice White ultimately ap-
pears to recognize the problem with awaiting post-reapportionment 
results, but his admission of a predictive measure seems peripheral 
to the thrust of his argument. This admission is, however, the open-
ing toward what we believe to be the only appropriate measure of 
110. The use of subsequent legislative results involves Monday-morning quarterbacking. 
In the first place, gerrymandering must be adjudicated before the next election so that an 
unfair plan is not allowed to operate for one or more times before being judged, because 
public policy adverse to the disadvantaged group will be passed between that election and a 
decision by the court. Moreover, Monday-morning analysts are neutralizing the effects of 
quality candidates and targeted campaign efforts in the legislative contest. What would be 
the incentive for a party to engage in careful candidate recruitment and vigorous campaign 
activity if their victory might be denied because their efforts were too successful? The re-
quirement that critics of a redistricting plan wait until a second election has been run is worse. 
That is Tuesday-morning quarterbacking. 
The plurality also questioned whether any election results are in fact predictive of subse-
quent election results. They quote the district court as finding that in Indiana, at least, re-
turns are not predictive. Bandemer, 106 S. Ct. at 2812. 
This question is misdirected for the same reasons that any post·hoc legislative seats/ 
results analysis is not acceptable: in another year there may be different candidates, different 
campaigns, different issues, and different voters. The gerrymandering issue should only deal 
with the partisan voting component of the complex voter calculus. The search for a partisan 
index should not also have to overcome the burden of non-party components of the vote for 
specific legislative candidates, which is what happens if legislative seat totals are used to 
evaluate a districting plan. 
Ill. Id. at 2831 n. 10 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
112. Id. at 2814 n.l7. "Projected election results based on district boundaries and past 
voting patterns may certainly support this type of claim, even where no election has yet been 
held under the challenged districting." (emphasis in original). 
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gerrymandering-one that does not have to wait for subsequent 
elections after a districting plan is put into effect. 
According to the Bandemer holding, even if the result over the 
long term, or projected results, did show seriousiB partisan dis-
crimination, that may not be sufficient evidence to void a districting 
plan. It is not enough to show that election of a party's candidates 
has been made more difficult; the plaintiffs would still have to show 
that they were excluded from the entire political process: slating, 
endorsements, nominations, even from casting a vote. It is simply 
impossible to meet this standard. Requiring plaintiffs to gather 
proof about the perceptions of persons who did not surface for en-
dorsement, or fashioning tests for what constitutes an effective slate 
of nominations seems unrealistic. Even more tendentious is the plu-
rality's assertion that minority party voters are not shut out of any 
consideration by the majority party officeholders.II4 This is the ra-
tionale for "virtual representation," which should have been laid to 
rest by the American Revolution. What is the election about if it is 
not between candidates who offer somewhat different policy alterna-
tives on at least some questions? Parties matter in elections, and 
parties matter in legislative decisions. It would be an impossible 
burden to require a plaintiff to prove that elections are not meaning-
less, that the representative fails to serve him or her as faithfully as 
constituents of the member's own party, or that the legislator fails 
to match the voter's policy preferences on rollcalls.IIs 
The plurality recognizes that the redistricting plan must be 
judged as a whole, that is, it must meet a statewide standard: Are 
the Democrats (in Indiana) treated fairly? Justice White reasons 
113. The district court in Bandemer had said that any discrimination in districting 
would be unconstitutional. Id. at 2811. The Supreme Court plurality distanced themselves 
from such standard, fearing an avalanche of cases. Yet until a clear standard evolves--one 
that can be applied by district drawers at the beginning of the redistricting process-it is 
likely that virtually every plan will appear in a case for exclusion or inclusion, as happens 
with most new constitutional tests. Merely announcing that the standards are tough is un-
likely to deter further litigation. 
114. "An individual or a group of individuals who votes for a losing candidate is usually 
deemed to be adequately represented by the winning candidate and to have as much opportu-
nity to influence that candidate as other voters in the district." Bandemer, 106 S. Ct. at 2810. 
This conclusion draws a harsh dissent: "but it defies political realities to suppose that mem-
bers of a losing party have as much political influence over state government as do members 
of the victorious parties. Even the most conscientious state legislators do not disregard op-
portunities to reward persons or groups who were active supporters in their election cam-
paigns." Id. at 2830 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
115. The plurality Justices make the statement that the most common technique of ger-
rymandering-"stacking" large numbers of the minority in a few districts to "waste" their 
vot~oes not actually hurt voters. Id. at 2814. In fact, that is the primary way vote 
dilution occurs. What else is there to complain about in a gerrymander? This statement 
demonstrates that the Supreme Court's grasp of the political realities of gerrymandering is far 
from complete. 
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that the design of individual districts is of no particular concern. 
With that as a given, the plurality Justices chose not to look at 
structural anomalies like the lack of compactness and the inconsis-
tent use of multi-member districts. This reasoning also shows an 
unfamiliarity with the practicalities of gerrymandering. Almost 
certainly the controlling party in the legislature will not have over-
whelming dominance throughout the state. They therefore must 
seize advantages in specific districts, and give up advantages else-
where by sacrificing those districts which they cannot conceivably 
draw to ensure a win. In Indiana, the Republican district drawers 
used multi-member districts where it was to their advantage and 
refrained from using them where it would have disadvantaged 
them. The statewide result is simply the aggregate of decisions in 
the design of individual districts all over the state. Thus a statewide 
test for gerrymandering must be made, but the evidence of that re-
sult must come from examining local districts; the remedy, if any, 
will have to be sought by adjusting individual district lines. 
Focusing on district results does not mean proportional repre-
sentation. On one thing every Justice in Bandemer is agreed: no 
one wants proportional representation. Justice White says that rea-
sonable proportionality in results does not have to involve propor-
tional representation in the literal sense, and that any competent 
and creative district judge could tell the difference.116 Justice 
O'Connor and her concurring colleagues are not convinced. In 
their view, the whole idea of a district system for representatives is a 
compromise between winner-take-all and proportional representa-
tion. She fears that testing the aggregate outcomes of district elec-
tions will lead inevitably to a proportional representation standard, 
which would be fatal for the two-party system in this country.m 
We demonstrated earlier that single-member districting could 
never guarantee proportional representation at every level of state-
wide results, based on the tendency of the majority to gain more 
than a proportionate share of seats for each increment of additional 
statewide vote. We termed this the "balloon effect.11s The balloon 
effect occurs because, in a single-member district system, any addi-
tional votes that one party gets will make a difference first in several 
marginal districts, tipping them into the majority party's column 
more rapidly than the proportion by which that party's statewide 
vote has risen. The courts now seem to understand this "law" and 
to be willing to live with it. Yet applying a pure proportionality 
116. /d.at2816. 
117. /d. at 2823-24 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). 
118. Backstrom, Robins & Eller, supra note 2, at 1134. 
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standard to statewide results (either aggregate legislative or some 
base-race totals) will inevitably take from the majority party some 
of the excess seats that they gain through the balloon effect. We 
propose an adjustment to insure that this does not occur. 
To recap this discussion of the Court's suggested measures for 
gerrymandering: The plurality correctly focused on requiring a 
political measure for a political problem-a measure of partisan 
strength to identify unfair partisan advantage-but in addition they 
required an overwhelming pattern of state oppression that denies 
people their elementary right to participate in the electoral pro-
cess.tt9 They have rejected the total legislative seats won/aggregate 
state legislative vote ratio used by the district court in Indiana to 
strike down that plan, but they did not reject it for its principal 
weaknesses: lack of uniformity, ad hominem contamination, and 
untimeliness. They admitted that a predictive measure could be 
used to identify a gerrymander, yet expressed doubt that election 
returns are predictive at all. They went on contrarily to suggest the 
need for examination of returns from multiple elections after a pro-
posed districting plan was enacted. 
This bewildering array of precepts can probably be explained 
as the result of Justice White's need to craft a plurality from a coali-
tion of Justices with very divergent ideas on how to proceed in a 
new field.t2o Although the Supreme Court's guidelines contain the 
elements of an adequate measure of gerrymandering, the parts are 
not yet clear and consistent. District judges will find it very chal-
lenging to try to formulate workable measures and standards that 
119. The term and concept of "oppression" is taken from, D. Lowenstein, Congressional 
Reapportionment and the Party System (paper delivered at APSA, Washington, D.C., 
(1986)). 
120. Like the Justices, scholars have not agreed on what is the most appropriate measure 
of partisan gerrymandering. For example, one writer presents a set of twelve "features"-
including such things as district-drawing techniques (packing, fragmenting), incumbent ma-
nipulation, unnecessarily disregarding population equality, compactness, and sub-unit bound-
aries-which indicate the presence of a gerrymander. In addition, three other "flags"-
multi-member districts, gross disproportion in seats/results and lack of competition-signal a 
possible gerrymander. Grofman, Criteria for Districting: A Social Science Perspective 33 
UCLA L. REv. 77, 117-18 (1985). The problem with this formulation is that all criteria! 
seem equal; there is no guide to what mix of the factors would be determinative, and of course 
to use the post-hoc seats/results test is unacceptable, as was discussed earlier. 
Another prominent scholar concentrates on the "swing ratio"-how much change in 
seats would result from each percentage point change in percentage of the statewide aggre-
gate vote. Niemi, supra note 4, at 194-95. He recommends achieving "symmetry," which 
means creating districts so that both parties would benefit equally from a given percentage-
point change in the statewide vote in their direction. /d. at 200-01. We believe that this 
would be impossible to achieve in real situations, given the lack of uniformity in geographical 
distribution of partisans in most states. Backstrom, Robins & Eller, supra note 2, at 137. 
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can survive on appeal. We think we can be of assistance in this 
effort. 
IV. A PROPOSED MEASURE AND STANDARD FOR 
EVALUATION OF GERRYMANDERING 
We have now analyzed what the Supreme Court (and others) 
have recommended about measures of gerrymandering. We will 
now lay out what we believe to be an appropriate measure and a 
standard that avoid the pitfalls of other measures. 
A. MEASURE AND STANDARD DEFINED 
Although the term "measure" has been used by most commen-
tators to encompass everything that the Court must now do to deal 
with partisan gerrymandering, it is helpful to recognize that there 
are in reality two concepts involved that should not be confused: 
measures and standards. 
A measure, as described above for population, is a device or 
method of detecting and calibrating disparities. The second concept 
is that of a standard-once a measure of disparity (a largely neutral 
term) has been agreed on, how great must that disparity be to con-
stitute an inequality (a somewhat value-laden word) or discrimina-
tion (implying an intolerable degree). The ultimate standard is how 
equal between the parties, by the chosen measure of partisan advan-
tage, will the Court require the districts to be? Using the popula-
tion analogy will make this difference clear. As mentioned, the 
most commonly used measure of population disparity is the devia-
tion of extreme districts from the ideal, while the required standard 
of population equality for congressional districts is anti-statistical 
perfection-far less than 1 percent deviation from ideal-and for 
legislative districts expanding permissiveness-almost 90 percent in 
Wyoming.m 
In dealing with partisan gerrymandering, first the Court must 
adopt a measure to ascertain whether and to what degree a disparity 
is present, and then it must choose a standard of disparity that is 
acceptable before a specific districting act will be overturned. 
B. STEPS IN MEASUREMENT AND EVALUATION 
Succinctly, our measure of partisan effectsl22 is the number of 
districts in which the majority party dominates as indicated by the 
121. Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835 (1983). 
122. For the full development of the measure, see Backstrom, Robins & Eller, supra note 
2, at 1131-39. The discussion of standards is new to this paper. 
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results of a base race. Under our standard, impermissible gerry-
mandering is present unless that number is 50 percent plus one of 
all districts. The measure is determined and the standard applied in 
several steps, which are listed here and then explained in some de-
tail: (1) ascertaining majority party strength in each district; (2) in-
dexing the majority party's actual strength to 50 percent; (3) setting 
majority rule as the primary value in assessing the fairness of a dis-
tricting plan; (4) counting the number of districts in which the ma-
jority party is dominant. If this is other than just over one-half the 
districts, the plan is a partisan gerrymander, unless irremediable 
under given standards of population and possible structural 
standards. 
C. ASCERTAINING MAJOR PARTY STRENGTH 
To measure the partisanship of individual districts and calcu-
late the degree of overall dominance of a party in a state requires 
some kind of index. 
Our measure is an effects measure, but it does not deliberately 
guarantee any foreordained results of an election. We distinguish 
between the terms effects and results. Our goal is a fair distribution 
of districts dominated by each party's supporters. Our first step in 
that analysis is choosing an appropriate base race for determining 
party strength. 
A partisan base race is a previous statewide election in which 
the choice between candidates appears to have been determined by 
partisan sentiments of the voters rather than transient issues or 
charismatic personal appeal. The vote on this race within each pro-
posed legislative district will be an estimate of underlying partisan 
sentiment in that district. Such partisan sentiments will affect the 
outcome of the subsequent legislative elections conducted in the 
several districts, but will not solely determine the subsequent results 
of the legislative races, either individually or in the aggregate. 
We use a statewide base race because it is an election that 
presents an identical choice of candidates everywhere in the state. 
In contrast, each legislative race has unique candidates, and some 
candidates are unopposed; both factors make it impossible to com-
pare the partisan characteristics of precincts at the borders of dis-
tricts as they are traded back and forth in trial districting plans. 
All sides in the lower court in Bandemer embraced our concept 
of a base race, although they differed in how to calculate it in Indi-
ana.123 In some states, the base race may be a largely "invisible" 
123. Brief for Appellee at 12-13 n.l5, Bandemer (No. 84-1244). 
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contest (such as state superintendent of public instruction), where 
individual candidates never mount a major media campaign, and 
the voters have few cues to guide them in their vote except the party 
label on the ballot. In other states, it may be a major race in which 
candidates are evenly matched in name familiarity and personal ap-
peal, leaving partisanship to be the main difference between the can-
didates. The aim is to arrive at a previous election that represents a 
kind of "normal vote."I24 A base race does not have to be 
equivalent to the estimated normal vote of a state to be useful. So 
long as the race picked correlates highly with other partisan races-
that is, it rises and falls proportionately in various parts of the state 
rather than exhibiting unique fluctuations in various parts of the 
state-it can be used in our measure. 
Courts should not be reluctant to use a base race as a test for 
gerrymandering. After all, the state political party organizations 
and legislative caucus leaders are using some kind of a base race to 
estimate partisan effects of various configurations of districts. That 
is what the expensive computer consultants use for data. 
Because the Bandemer plurality shied away from a single indi-
cator of partisan strength, courts may prefer using as the base an 
average of several statewide races in a single year. We continue to 
recommend a single race that correlates highly.12s A multiple-race 
amalgam may be a more persuasive index to the general public and 
to judges who are averse to statistics. Averaging several races over 
124. The concept of the normal vote was developed by Philip E. Converse. See A. 
CAMPBELL, P. CONVERSE, W. MILLER & D. STOKES, ELECTIONS AND THE POLITICAL OR-
DER 9-39 (1966). The normal vote was to be the division between the major parties in a 
hypothetical race in which only the partisan factor was operative. The normal vote in a state 
is often developed with the use of survey research findings of statewide party identification 
distribution. Survey data is not, however, suitable for establishing base-race data for each 
proposed legislative district needed for a measure designed to identify gerrymandering, be-
cause it is prohibitively expensive to conduct adequate surveys in each tiny subarea of a state. 
Techniques have been developed to estimate distributions of individual voter characteristics 
within small geographic areas by noting the relationship of various attitudes to certain demo-
graphic characteristics statewide, and then using small area census figures to find out how 
many people of those census types reside in the area and assuming they exhibit the same 
attitudes as their statewide cohorts. But this statistical procedure rests on assumptions and 
manipulations that are too sophisticated for easy judicial and popular acceptance. 
Another possible database on which to estimate party identification is registration data. 
In the states that require pre-registration by party choice, some information is available. If 
these data are used, it would be necessary to ignore registered independents. When actual 
voting results are used, most of these independents have sorted themselves out by choice 
between the major-party candidates. In fact the party registrants are under no compulsion to 
vote in accordance with their registration, so the voting figures also reflect their actual parti-
san behavior. 
125. Our calculations for Minnesota have shown an in incredibly high correlation (above 
r=.90) between the race we selected for use and other statewide races the same year and in 
previous years. That being true, no explanatory power would be gained by melding other 
similar races with the leading one. 
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several years is less suitable because assumptions about the effect of 
rising and falling total vote on individual districts operate only at 
one point in time.t26 Moreover, the difficulties of matching pre-
cincts over the years pose an immense, practical burden on the data 
gatherers. 
D. INDEXING MAJORITY PARTY STRENGTH TO 50 PERCENT 
Only in a rare state (like Indiana, as shown in the Bandemer 
briefs)t27 will a statewide party index be exactly at or very near to 
50 percent. In most circumstances the actual statewide base race 
percentage of a majority party must be reduced to 50 percent over-
all, with concomitant reductions in the base race distribution for 
each proposed district. 
This adjustment is made by reducing the actual vote in each 
precinct by a uniform figure--the difference in percentage points 
between the actual statewide base race and 50 percent. In the ex-
ample in our previous article, where the Minnesota statewide base 
race was 54 percent, we subtracted 4 percentage points from the 
actual base race percentage in each precinct in the state to yield an 
index percentage. That number was then multiplied by the total 
number of actual raw votes cast in that precinct for the base race 
candidates to arrive at a new "vote" total for the majority party. 
Finally, these new precinct "votes" were added together for each 
proposed district and its index percentage was computed.t2s 
Legislative districts are apportioned on the basis of full popula-
tion count rather than eligible voters, registered voters, or actual 
voters, while political measures are typically based on actual votes. 
As a result, statewide vote totals underweigh the effect of low-tum-
out districts. One scholar urged that aggregating the percentages on 
the base race in each district to a statewide total and then averaging 
them will compensate for this. The process yields a mean district 
vote percentage for each party, rather than pooling raw votes and 
then calculating a statewide percent, as we have done.t29 This ad-
justment would have the effect of treating all districts equally in the 
calculation of a statewide base race percentage, just as they are 
drawn equally in population. We maintain, however, that while dis-
tricts are and should be equal in entitlement to a representative, 
126. Scarrow, supra note 4. 
127. Brief for Appellee at 13, Bandemer (No. 84-1244). 
128. This uniform percentage reduction is not represented to be a statement of historical 
outcomes in the United States. Rather, it is an index at one point in time that shows a party's 
base race percentage. If a party were to drop by a certain number of percentage points, the 
calculation shows in how many districts that party would no longer be in the majority. 
129. Lowenstein, supra note 4, at 52. 
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they should lose or gain potential impact in partisanship by their 
actual turnout. Since children and nonvoters are now counted in 
apportioning representatives, we believe that averaging district per-
centages rather than adding actual turnout of voters to the state 
levels in effect would be counting them twice. A court could, how-
ever, adopt either method. 
E. CHOOSING A STANDARD OF FAIRNESS 
Next, a standard must be chosen for determining a fair distri-
bution of partisan advantage. 
Because it seems to us that the essence of a fair districting plan 
is whether the majority party (indexed to 50 percent) is dominant in 
a majority of the districts, we use this as a starting point, or ful-
crum. If the statewide strength of a party is greater than 50 per-
cent, the number of districts in which that party would be in a 
majority would swell rapidly; likewise, as the erstwhile majority 
party's strength drops below 50 percent, the number of districts in 
which it is dominant would fall much faster.Do 
Thus we do not require proportional representation-remem-
ber that we are not evaluating actual legislative election results-
but we do use dominance in 50 percent of the districts as a starting 
point when the majority party's statewide strength is indexed to 50 
percent. This is the reasonable proportionality that we think Justice 
White is seeking, m while avoiding actual proportional representa-
tion. We cannot emphasize strongly enough that our measure does 
not guarantee any party any specified result after an election. The 
goal being sought is fairness in the opportunity to be elected (from a 
partisan base standard) that is granted before any election. This is 
the "level playing field" argument. 
A prominent reapportionment scholar cited earlier argues that 
the only required criterion for a fair districting plan should be that 
the swing ratio be high, thus insuring volatility in numbers of seats 
held as statewide party fortunes fluctuate.m He does not, however, 
specify a starting point; apparently any division of districts would 
be acceptable to him. In our opinion, this is not an adequate stan-
dard for identifying a gerrymander. 
Another frequently espoused goal for fair districting plans is to 
have as many competitive districts as possible.t33 The idea is that 
130. Backstrom, Robins & Eller, supra note 2, at 1134 n.43. 
131. Davis v. Bandemer,- U.S.-, 106 S. Ct. 2797, 2816 (1986). 
132. Niemi, supra note 4. 
133. Mayhew, Congressional Representation: Theory and Practice in Drawing the Dis-
tricts, in REAPPORTIONMENT IN THE 1970s, 249, 255-62 (N. Polsby ed. 1971). What consti-
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the party out of power would have an excellent chance of capturing 
legislative seats. We do not think, however, that high turnover in 
state legislatures should be a constitutional requirement. It may not 
even be a desirable goal, as some stability of membership is useful in 
a legislative body. Besides, competition that gives voters an effec-
tive choice does not have to be confined to the general election, 
since districts that do not appear to be competitive by that standard 
could experience serious challenges in primaries. The critical weak-
ness in using only competitiveness as a goal for fair districting is 
that it ignores the overall number of districts in which each party 
dominates. A plan could be very unfair to the majority (or the mi-
nority) with their only sop being a promise that many of the opposi-
tion are vulnerable in some future election. 
F. DECIDING WHETHER A PLAN IS A GERRYMANDER 
The final step in deciding whether a districting plan is a gerry-
mander is to count the number of districts in which each party 
dominates (measured by the index base race). If this is other than 
one over 50 percent of the districts, a gerrymander is present, unless 
further adjustments of district lines are impossible. 
If the districting plan gives unfair advantage to one party, the 
appropriate remedy is to draw a new plan that is less unfair. It will 
not always be possible, however, to draw a completely fair plan. It 
could be that the residential concentration of one party's adherents 
in a state is such that their strength cannot be spread among more 
districts without violating accepted standards of compactness. In 
these instances, the best surviving plan, even if it is still somewhat 
unfair, should not be judged a gerrymander ihat requires correc-
tion. We do not, however, believe this would be a common problem; 
we have shown earlier that it is relatively easy to make minor ad-
justments in districting lines to achieve a fair plan.134 
G. DECISION RULES 
By way of summarizing our argument, here are decision rules 
for ascertaining the presence of partisan gerrymandering: 
1. Test a plan before enactment, or if an act is under judicial 
challenge, before an election has been held under it. 
2. Establish a de minimis standard of population equality-
we urge 5 percent for state legislative districts and 1 percent for 
tutes competitive districts has been extensively debated. See Pfeiffer, The Measurement of 
Inter·Pany Competition and Systemic Stability, 61 AM. PoL. Sci. REV. 457 (1967). 
134. Backstrom, Robins & Eller, supra note 2. 
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congressional districts-and reject any plan that does not meet that 
standard. 
3. Allow no partial or new use of multi-member districts. 
4. Test the districting plan that results by an adequate polit-
ical measure-similar to the one we have outlined above-and, if 
the plan does not meet the standard of base majority rule, declare it 
unconstitutional. 
5. If no alternative plans are fair, measured by the same crite-
rion, a court-appointed master should be directed to develop a plan 
that meets the standard. 
6. If more than one proffered plan is fair politically, compare 
them as to visual compactness, adherence to subdivision lines, as-
serted community of interest, and reasonably neutral treatment of 
incumbents; select the plan that achieves the highest quality accord-
ing to these considerations. 
In summary, our measure relies centrally on a political index, 
as the Supreme Court plurality now requires. But our index is in-
dependent of individual legislative candidate effects. It is forward-
looking, as permitted by the Court, rather than retrospective. Our 
standard is that of majority rule. It does not penalize the majority 
for the bonus it will receive in a single-member district system by 
applying a crude proportional representation standard. But it also 
does not guarantee any victories to one party or the other in the 
subsequent election. It instead provides a fair starting point from 
which parties can vie for advantage. 
We are not sanguine that courts would readily accept a stan-
dard as fine-tuned as ours, which requires new districts to be drawn 
if changing a single district would make the plan fairer. It seems 
more likely, given what the Supreme Court has said about willing-
ness to tolerate some gerrymandering, that district judges and the 
Supreme Court eventually would adopt a band of tolerance-not 
changing a districting plan even if the majority were in the majority 
in a few more or less districts than our measure shows them to de-
serve. We would not view this as a negation of our approach. 
But we strongly urge that the courts avoid two pitfalls that 
endanger majoritarian principles. First, any leeway should be uni-
directional, that is if an actual statewide majority party is dominant 
in fewer than half of the districts it should be brought up to the 
minimum. Second, if courts should fail to honor the inevitable sin-
gle-district balloon effect by using an unadjusted proportional stan-
dard as the test of fairness, the majority principle will have been 
violated, in effect, by giving a majority party less than 50 percent 
dominance when their strength is 50 percent. 
1987] GERRYMANDERING 317 
The most common result of gerrymandering, however, is not 
endangering majority rule, but rather the majority party's arroga-
tion of dominance in far more seats than it is entitled to. This is 
unfair, and should not be overlooked. That is what the entire anti-
gerrymandering exercise is about. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Solving partisan gerrymandering turned out to be less tractable 
than rectifying population inequalities. A solution is necessary, 
however, to insure fair election procedures. 
The Bandemer decision announces that it is time to move to-
ward an acceptable measure of partisan gerrymandering. There is 
at present no Supreme Court majority for any one measure of parti-
san gerrymandering. The Justices' statements may be seen either as 
(at best) a cry for assistance to develop an acceptable measure or (at 
worst) a Catch 22 that outlaws gerrymandering, but establishes a 
test that can never be met.I35 
Tackling gerrymandering is technically difficult, but it is not a 
thicket. The theoretical concept of gerrymandering is simple and 
135. Unfortunately, the next partisan gerrymandering case likely to come through the 
court system will be on congressional districting. A suit challenging California's congres· 
sional districting was set aside until Bandemer was settled, and is certain to be reactivated. 
Districting for congress and for the state legislatures is different in several regards. First, 
congressional districting is derivative and decentralized, while state legislative districting is 
primary and self-contained. That is, the state legislators, in most states, district for them-
selves, while the state legislators and not the congressmen district for congressional seats. 
This means that state legislators have a fundamental conflict of interest in the state instance, 
necessitating greater outside scrutiny. Also, the whole state legislative policy machine is built 
through one districting act by a legislature, while the overall membership of Congress comes 
as the result of fifty separate congressional districting acts. No one state redistricting can 
determine, or even substantially affect, the partisan balance in Congress. Further, if a legisla-
ture is gerrymandered, control of the next redistricting for itself and for Congress could also 
be affected. If a legislature is fairly districted, however, that state's congressional districting 
is likely to be fairer, and a change of control for the next districting for both legislators and 
congressmen is more likely. 
Our measure-the base race domination of individual districts-applies in testing a con-
gressional districting plan as well as a legislative plan. But our standard, given many fewer 
congressional seats in general, becomes lumpy (in a three-seat state having only 100%, 67%, 
33% and 0% of the seats to aim for). Of course, our standard of majority dominance could 
apply only state delegation by state delegation, rather than addressing the important question 
of overall control of the United States House of Representatives. 
Even justiciability of congressional districting could be challenged-although the present 
Supreme Court seems unlikely to agree-on the grounds that the narrow definition of "polit-
ical question" as affecting separation of powers would prohibit the federal judiciary from 
interfering with the election procedures of its co-equal branch, Congress. D. Lowenstein, 
supra note 119. 
It would indeed be unfortunate if the special problems involved in handling congres-
sional gerrymandering were to impede the development of a measure and standard to correct 
the more important and more tractable problem of state legislative gerrymandering. 
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clear. No one can seriously defend gerrymandering, and the media 
and the public will support anti-gerrymandering strictures. 
Despite our confidence in our measure, courts may not be 
ready yet to give any specific political measure constitutional status. 
This is not discouraging. Even population disparity measures, 
which now seem so simple, took many years to develop to their 
present level of acceptability. We should expect at least as difficult 
a search before full agreement is reached on a specific measure of 
partisan gerrymandering. We have no doubt, however, that the 
measure that will ultimately be adopted will be of the type we first 
presented in 1978, which subsequently has received increasing at-
tention. We present it here in a modified form that we feel will be 
more useful to courts and legislators who now, after Bandemer, 
must come to grips with this question. 
Justice White conceded that it was not likely that the 
equivalent of the arithmetic one person/one vote standard could be 
achieved in partisan gerrymandering cases.t36 But standards are 
transparently obvious in very few instances. Courts are frequently 
faced with degrees of uncertainty and conflicting testimony. There 
is no reason to hold partisan gerrymandering cases to higher stan-
dards of certainty and agreement. The gravity of the evil and the 
inability to obtain redress elsewhere require judicial action to fulfill 
the promise of relief annunciated in Bandemer. 
Cogent standards on gerrymandering will improve the whole 
process of redistricting. If clear fairness standards exist, legislators 
will be more hesitant to breach them, resulting in a reduced need 
for judicial intervention. Moreover, redistricting is not inherently a 
legislative function. If there were less partisan advantage to gain, 
legislators would be more willing to delegate that power to non-
legislative reapportionment commissions in the states where legisla-
tures are the exclusive districting authority. But we do not believe 
that a fair districting plan is automatically guaranteed because it is 
drawn by a neutral source. Courts must retain the ultimate right to 
apply appropriate standards to test contested plans for fairness to 
the major political interests of the state. 
136. Davis v. Bandemer,- U.S.-, 106 S. Ct. 2797, 2805 (1986). 
